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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA FILE SSCT
RECPT # _____OCA 86-1240
15 April 1986

The Honorable Dave Durenberger
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed are my answers for the record to the questions contained in your letter of March 25th. I look forward to continued cooperation with the Committee. This letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Leahy.

Sincerely,




25X1

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Enclosures

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - DDI
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B-405-1R

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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OCA 86-1229


15 April 1986

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

Enclosed are my answers for the record to the questions contained in your letter of March 25th. I look forward to continued cooperation with the Committee. This letter is also being sent to Chairman Durenberger.

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DI Response to SSCI Questions for the Record

1. Last year the Select Committee asked Richard Kerr (who had represented the DDI at a hearing on the National Intelligence Strategy) how much time the DDI required to bring a new analyst on board. Mr. Kerr responded that the average time from recruitment to entry was about one year.

(a) What steps, if any, have been taken to reduce the processing time required to bring new analysts on board?

Response. Early in calendar year 1985 the Office of Personnel implemented a program to reduce applicant processing time to a maximum of 120 days. This measurement begins when the formal application package is received and ends with the granting of full clearances. The intended reduction in average processing time was to be achieved by hiring additional staff to process applicants, establishing and assuring compliance with a series of milestones and procedural refinements, and the use of enhanced automated systems and techniques to support the application process.

[redacted]

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For the DI in particular, the volume of applicants was increased by an intensified recruitment drive by the Office of Personnel and DI managers and analysts acting as part-time recruiters. Candidates generated by this effort were given processing priority for polygraph and medical appointments. With this effort the DI was able to meet its analyst recruitment goal for FY 1985. During the period January 1985 to March 1986, the DI hired [redacted] officer-level personnel. [redacted]

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(b) Has the average processing time changed during the past year?

Response. Processing time for [redacted] officer-level people hired by the DI averaged 109 days. This compares with an average hiring time of approximately 270 days for officers hired in 1984. [redacted]

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(c) What additional steps could be taken to improve the situation?

Response. The Agency's applicant processing system has undergone several evaluations in recent years which have helped cut substantially applicant processing time to the 120 day time frame. These evaluations, which are continuous, are part of the effort to refine the process and make it more efficient. For example, one specific aspect of the system currently being examined centers on ways to reduce the large number of applicants who must be put into

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process to obtain each new hire. Reducing this ratio through improved screening techniques would conserve limited processing system resources, preserve the large reduction in processing time that has been achieved thus far, and make possible additional improvements. [redacted]

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2. In what specific fields has the DDI encountered difficulties in recruiting new analysts? What particular skills (in addition to language skills, which we are familiar with as a chronic problem) appear to be in short supply?

Response. Other than the PhD economist, area specialists for Third World countries, and electrical engineers and computer scientists, we have been quite successful in recruiting against DI needs. Of course, the recruitment of highly trained scientists and engineers (particularly electrical and aerospace engineers) for OSWR continues to be a very real problem because of the competition from industry. New engineering/scientific graduates often cannot or will not wait for us to clear them when they can go to industry immediately. People with the qualifications we require are in demand, and the Civil Service is becoming less attractive--cancelled pay raises, increasing retirement contributions, changes to the retirement system, health insurance programs, etc.--making it even harder for us to win over new graduates. As important is the difficulty we experience trying to retain young scientists and engineers in the Agency because of these same factors. Indeed, once individuals have passed the rigorous background investigations and polygraph program and are fully cleared, they become very attractive targets for recruitment by industry. This is particularly true in the case of those contractors doing business with various Intelligence Community elements. [redacted]

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3. Please describe the changes you have made in the components of SOVA responsible for assessing domestic economic policy and internal party/government politics in the Soviet Union.

Response. In March 1985 the analytical components respectively responsible for assessing economic performance and domestic politics were combined into a single group. Two new branches were concomitantly established, one focusing on citizen expectations and societal stress and the other on the government machinery responsible for enacting leadership policies. The reorganization's purpose--to facilitate interdisciplinary analysis of Soviet internal dynamics--was made clear to all involved. [redacted]

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The SOVA organizational change and the subsequent commitment of those involved to integrative analysis has substantially improved the quality of analysis on the domestic scene. The full participation of SOVA economists and political scientists in the research planning process has led to the commissioning of a series of papers focused on the interdisciplinary aspect of the problem. Closer working relationships have evolved between SOVA economic and political analysts. This has been true both in the process of drafting and reviewing analysis and, perhaps more importantly, in informal sharing of information, expertise, and perspective. [REDACTED]

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The reorganization's success is manifest in the integrated analytical approach taken in a number of papers published over the last year, especially:

- o US-Soviet Trade: Political and Economic Determinants (April 1985)
- o Gorbachev's Economic Agenda: Promises, Potential, and Pitfalls (September 1985)
- o Potential Gorbachev Initiatives in Foreign Trade (December 1985)
- o The Soviet Experiment in Industrial Management: Status and Prospects (March 1986) [REDACTED]

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4. Many of the additional resources the DDI has acquired in recent years have been placed in OSWR and in SOVA components responsible for analyzing Soviet defense industries.

(a) Are finished intelligence products from OSWF and SOVA routinely routed to the Army Threat Analysis Center (ITAC), the Navy Operational Intelligence Center, the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division (FTD), and other DoD intelligence units responsible for developing System Threat Assessment Reports?

Response. In most cases our finished intelligence documents are sent in multiple copies to DIA who has the responsibility for dissemination within DoD. In addition, depending on the subject matter, copies of finished intelligence are sent directly to specified components of the military intelligence organizations. [REDACTED]

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(b) Please describe the working relationships between OSWR and SOVA/DI analysts and the analysts in these units (e.g., how frequently do they meet, do they coordinate assessments with each other, etc.).

Response. DI analysts deal mainly with analysts in the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division (FTD), the Navy's Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), the Army's Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC), and, to a lesser extent, with the Army's Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MISC). There is contact on a periodic basis at meetings of Intelligence Community working groups, especially those of WSSIC and STIC. There is irregular contact associated with Community products (NIEs, IIMs) and Agency research projects of mutual interest. The latter normally take the form of analyst-to-analyst meetings, briefings, and submission of draft papers for informal review. Virtually all our analysts know their counterparts at these DoD units, and maintain occasional telephone contact. While we do not formally coordinate our publications with them, we share our analysis, seek their comments, and consider their views. [REDACTED]

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Overall our contacts vary greatly in frequency, ranging from weeks to months between contacts depending on the issue at hand. Every 1-2 years SOVA/DI managers discuss research plans and programs with managers at these DoD agencies. [REDACTED]

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(c) How frequently (if at all) do analysts from the strategic forces units of SOVA meet with targeteer personnel in the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). For example, do SOVA analysts travel to Offutt AFB to discuss targeting issues; does JSTPS ever present DDI with questions concerning the suitability and characteristics of targets; etc.?

Response. OSWR analysts visit about 10 times a year with JSTPS personnel primarily to provide technical support in the area of Soviet weapon systems performance. SOVA analysts also meet frequently with JSTPS personnel on an ad hoc basis to discuss matters of mutual concern. Within the last two months, for example, Brigadier General Horton of JSTPS visited SOVA to discuss Soviet strategic targeting, and SOVA analysts traveled to Omaha to brief JSTPS on SOVA analyses of the implications of the recent Soviet and US arms control proposals, as well as to brief JSTPS on Soviet perceptions of the vulnerability of silo-based ICBMs. Moreover, a SOVA analyst recently spent three weeks at SAC as part of a CIA/SAC analyst exchange program. During this time the analyst had extensive discussions with JSTPS personnel on strategic targeting issues. [REDACTED]

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(d) Have any DI analysts participated in the development of the Damage Criteria Study? If so, what was their role?


Response. DI analysts did not participate in the development of the Damage Criteria Study. DI requests for access to the Damage Criteria Study have been denied by DoD on "need-to-know" grounds.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ES

Re Exec Sec Action Item ER 0936X

No written response required, requested
hearing took place on 20 March.
OCA has transcript in their official file.



Date 9 May 86

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TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI-D		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt		X		
13	D/O&OCA	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/IPC/DI		X		
18	(Attn: [Redacted])				
19	PR File				
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22					
SUSPENSE		14 Apr 86 Date			

Remarks

To 13: Please have response prepared and provided.

Executive Secretary
20 Apr 86
Date

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7 Mar 86

Mary/Executive Secretariat said that per
OCA that action completed on the following documents:

ER86-0935
ER86-0936


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7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/ [redacted] OCA	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/TPC/NT		X		
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SUSPENSE		<u>10 March 1986</u> Date			

Remarks

3637 (10-81)

Executive Secretary

6 March 1986

Date

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WASHINGTON, DC 20510

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IN RESPONSE, PLEASE
 REFER TO #86- 0799

February 27, 1986

Mr. Robert M. Gates
 Deputy Director for Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

On behalf of the Select Committee on Intelligence, we wish to invite you to appear before a hearing the Committee will hold on March 20th at 4:00 P.M. The purpose of this hearing is to address issues relating to planning of intelligence on potentially critical situations in the Third World. This hearing is being held as part of the Select Committee's review of the Fiscal Year 1987 National Intelligence Strategy and the Committee's consideration of guidelines for the FY 1988 National Intelligence Strategy.

The hearing will be held before the full Committee and, of course, will be closed. Security considerations require you to furnish a list of all witnesses and staff who will accompany you to the Committee Clerk at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing. We ask that your presentation be as informal as possible and that any prepared statements be submitted for the record. Your presentation should not exceed 10-15 minutes so as to allow ample time for questions by the Committee Members.

In our hearings, we are examining the entire intelligence process; the levying of requirements; the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information; and the use of this information by the intelligence consumer. As a key producer of intelligence on the Third World, the Committee would like you briefly to outline your near-term priorities for intelligence collection and analysis on potentially critical situations that could affect important U.S. interests there.

DCI
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
Mr. Robert M. Gates
February 27, 1986
Page Two

In addition to yourself, we have also invited to attend our March 20th hearing Secretary of State Shultz, and Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in order to provide the Committee an intelligence consumer's perspective. For the views of other intelligence producers we have invited Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, Director, Bureau for Intelligence and Research of the Department of State and LTG Leonard Perroots, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.


To give our staff ample time to prepare briefing materials for this hearing, please arrange for your representatives who will be involved in the preparation for the session to meet with our staff at least ten days before your scheduled appearance. This will ensure that the Committee will be able to cover all relevant issues.

If your staff has any questions concerning this hearing, please have them contact John Despres or Bruce Berkowitz, our staff members who are handling the arrangements for this session.

Sincerely,



Dave Durenberger
Chairman



Patrick J. Leahy
Vice Chairman